NONLINEARITY AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

A WORKING BIBLIOGRAPHY

as of July 7, 1999
 
 

Tom Czerwinski

Information Resources Management College

National Defense University


TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. National Security Policy and Strategy
II. Command and Control
III. Decisionmaking
IV. COGs and Target Sets
V. Doctrine
VI. Military Theory
VII. RMA
VIII. Intelligence
IX. Case Studies
X. Acquisition/Logistics
XI. Tools
WEBSITES


I. National Security Policy and Strategy

Cordesman, Anthony H. "The Quadrennial Defense Review and the American Threat to the United States." Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 14, 1996. "...history and the "chaos theory" visualized in Jurassic Park provide consistent warnings against the hubris and arrogance inherent in assuming that the right strategy and the right force posture can control our future."

Gardner, James N. "Mastering Chaos At History’s Frontier: The Geopolitics of Complexity," Complexity, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1997: 28-32. "The scientific paradigm of complexity may shape 21st Century geopolitics."

Grossmann, Siegfried and Gottfried Mayer-Kress. "Chaos in the International Arms Race," Nature, February 23, 1989: 701-4.

Jervis, Robert. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. For review see: Walt, Stephen M. "The Hidden Nature of Systems," The Atlantic Monthly, September 1998: 130-134. "A prominent social scientist explains how complex social connections affect international politics, economic competition, and the environment."

____________ . "Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions," in Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997: 45-72. http://www.dodccrp.org/comch03.htm

Liotta, P. H. "A Strategy of Chaos," Strategic Review, Spring 1998: 19-30.

Louisell, Chuck. "A Systems Dynamics Model for National Power Applied to Achieve Dominance," Secretary of Defense Strategic Studies Group, 1998.

Lucas, Chris and Yuri Milov, "Conflict as Emergent Phenomena of Complexity." Paper presented at the Ukrainian Conflict Resolution Association seminar: November 1997. September 15, 1998. http://www.calresco.force9.co.uk/group/conflict.htm

Mann, Steven R. "Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought." Parameters, Autumn 1992: 54-68. Questions both the imperative and desirability of pursuing stability at all costs in international diplomacy and strategy. An early and influential work by a practicing Foreign Service officer.

______________. "The Reaction to Chaos," in Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997: 135-149. http://www.dodccrp.org/comch06.htm

Peters, Ralph. "Heavy Peace," Parameters, Spring 1999: 71-79. "Our traditional hierarchical, pin-striped image of foreign policy is giving way to interactions webbed in a complex-adaptive system. Our foreign establishment no longer shapes the world, but responds to it." http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99spring/peters.htm

Rosenau, James N., "Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs," in Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997: 73-100. http://www.dodccrp.org/comch04.htm

Saperstein, Alvin M. "War and Chaos." American Scientist, November-December 1995: 548-557. "Complexity theory may be useful in modeling how real-world situations get out of control."

________________. "Complexity, Chaos, and National Security Policy: Metaphors or Tools?" in Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997: 45-72. http://www.dodccrp.org/comch05.htm

Snyder, Jack and Robert Jervis, eds. Coping with Complexity in the International System. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. A set of thirteen essays loosely based on Complexity theory, sponsored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.

Van Riper, Paul K. "Strategy and the Formulation of National Security Policy: The Military Content." 1997 Topical Symposium: Strategy and the Formulation of National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 7-8, 1997.

Wilhelm, Karen S. "Linear Thinkers in a Nonlinear World: Is There a Way Out?" Washington, DC: National War College, 2 November 1998.

_______________. "An Examination of the Applicability of Complex Systems Theory to Policy Making" Washington, DC: National War College, 14 December 1998.
 
 

II. Command and Control

Czerwinski, Thomas J. "Command and Control at the Crossroads." Parameters, Autumn 1996: 121-132. Essentially an analysis of Martin Van Creveld’s Command in War. Concludes that Van Creveld’s prescriptions for successful command and control reflect nonlinear dynamics principles, together with recommendations. http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96autumn/czerwins.htm

__________________. "Command and Control at the Crossroads." Marine Corps Gazette, October 1995: 13-15.

___________________. "The Realm of Uncertainty: "Command and Control at the Crossroads." Surface Warfare, January-February 1998: 12-14.

Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps.. Command and Control, MCDP-6. Washington, D.C., 4 October, 1996. http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/6/toc.htm

Dockery, John T. and A.E.R. Woodcock, editors. The Military Landscape: Mathematical Models of Combat. Cambridge, U.K.: Woodhead, 1993. A mathematical treatise on the application of Catastrophe theory to combat command and control modeling.

Fischer, Michael E. Mission-Type Orders in Joint Air Operations. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, May 1995. http://www.au.af.mil/au/saas/studrsch/fischer.doc

Gerber, David K. Adaptive Command and Control of Theater Air Power. Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1997.

Kahan, James P., D. Robert Worley and Cathleen Stasz. Understanding Commanders’ Information Needs. (R-3761-A) Santa Monica, CA: RAND, June 1989. Independently confirms and extends the validity of both Van Creveld’s rules and Klein’s Recognition-Primed Decisionmaking. Indispensable.

Kammerer, Jack. "Preserving Mission-Focused Command and Control," Military Review, September-October 1997: 65-70. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/sepoct97/kammerer.htm

Maxfield, Robert R., "Complexity and Organization Management," in Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997: 171-218. http://www.dodccrp.org/comch08.htm

Roman, Gregory A. "The Command or Control Dilemma," in Essays on Strategy XIV. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997: 149. html://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/essa/essaccdw.html

Schmitt, John F. "Command and (Out Of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity Theory," in Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997: 219-246. http://www.dodccrp.org/comch09.html

_____________. "Command and (Out Of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity Theory," Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1998: 55.

Straight, Michael, "Commander’s Intent: An Aerospace Tool for Command and Control?" Airpower Journal, Spring 1996: 36. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/spring96.html

Van Creveld, Martin. Command in War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

Van Creveld, Martin, with Steven L. Canby and Kenneth S. Brower. Air Power and Maneuver Warfare. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, July 1994.

Vincent, Gary A. "A New Approach to Command and Control: The Cybernetic Design." Airpower Journal, Summer 1993: 24-38. Argues for the elimination of "intermediate control units" which would thus minimize friction. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/vincent.html
 
 

III. Decisionmaking

Adolph, Robert B. "Playing the Numbers Game." Army Times, June 3, 1996:62. A frustrated Amy major rails against the excesses of the rational decisionmaking process.

Athens, Arthur. Unraveling the Mystery of Battlefield Coup d' Oeil. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. An excellent analysis of of Recognition-Primed Decisionmaking. Covers development and comparison to other methods, together with evidence in commanders’ memoirs, and recommendations.

Blasiol, Leonard A. "Intuitive Decisionmaking: Not For Everyone." Marine Corps Gazette, July 1996: 52-53. http://www.dodccrp.org/copch10.htm

Klein, Gary A. "Strategies of Decision Making." Military Review, May 1989: 56-64. Posits that military decision makers have come to rely too heavily on analytical decision-making processes, contributing to a reduction in the effectiveness of training, and support systems. Examines the strengths and weaknesses of competing decision-making processes and offers a "recognitional model" [Recognition-Primed Decisionmaking] for use in most combat and field situations. http://www.dodccrp.org/copch10.htm

___________. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. For review see: Ruppel, Andrew. "Take a Moment, Make a Decision," Decision Line, September/October 1998: 23-4.

Koenig, John A. A Commander's Telescope for the 21st Century: Command and Nonlinear Science in Future War. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 22 April 1996. "… nonlinear theoretical understanding of the mind coincides with the advent of Naturalistic Decision Making. Together they provide useful insights into the basis of creativity and intuition in war that we can capitalize upon to educate future commanders."

Krulak, Charles C. "Cultivating Intuitive Decisionmaking," Marine Corps Gazette, May. 1999: 18-22.

McKenzie, Kenneth F. "The Flash of the Kingfisher," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1990.

Moffat, James, L. Dodd, and J. Cathrell. Representing the Human Decision-Making Process in Fast Running Constructive Simulation Models. (DERA/CDA/HLS/TR971015/1.0) Farnborough. UK: Defence Evaluation Research Agency, January 1998.

Schmitt, John F.,, "How We Decide," Marine Corps Gazette, October 1995.

______________, "Observations on Decisionmaking in Battle," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1988.

Schmitt, John F. and Gary A. Klein. "Fighting in the Fog: Dealing with Battlefield Uncertainty," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1996: 62-69. Schmitt and Klein combine to employ nonlinear principles to dispute the concept of information dominance which provides the basis for Joint Vision 2010.

Spinney, Laura. "I Had a Hunch….," New Scientist, 5 September 1998, 42-47. Relates to Recognition-Primed Decisionmaking, in terms of brain design.

Tooke, Lamar, and Ralph Allen, "Strategic Intuition and the Art of War," Military Review, March-April 1995: 10-18.
 
 

IV. COGs and Target Sets

Fadok, David S. John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power's Quest For Strategic Paralysis. Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, June 1994. html://www.au.af.mil/au/saas/studrsch/fadok.doc

Felker, Edward J. "Airpower, Chaos, and Infrastructure: Lord of the Rings," Essays 1998. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998: 55-88. html://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/essaysch3.html

Holland, John M. Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1995. For excerpts see: http://www.dodccrp.org/copch1.htm

Pentland, Pat A. Center of Gravity Analysis and Chaos Theory, or How Societies Form, Function, and Fail. Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, AY 1993-94. For excerpts see: http://www.ccrp.org/copapp6.htm

Perrow, Charles. Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies. New York: Basic Books, 1984. For description see: http://www.dodccrp.org/copch7.htm

Rinaldi, Steven M. "Complexity Theory and Air Power," in Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997: 247-302. A historic study of U.S. airpower doctrine, showing a definite trend over time toward increasingly more nonlinear concepts. http://www.dodccrp.org/comch10a.html

_______________. Beyond the Industrial Web: Economic Synergies and Targeting Methodologies. Maxwell AFB, AL, April 1995. "First, economies are complex systems. We can employ complexity theory to understand economic infrastructures and their behaviors. Second, given the economies of complex systems, air planners must account for their dynamics when targeting them. Finally, the reductionist methodology followed in traditional economic targeting is invalid." http://www.au.af.mil/au/saas/studrsch/rinaldi.doc
 
 

V. Doctrine

Bassford, Christopher. "Nonlinearity in Marine Corps Doctrine," in Hoffman, F.G. and Gary Horne, eds., Maneuver Warfare Science, Quantico, VA: USMC Combat Development Command, 1998. http://www.Clausewitz.com/CZWHOME/Complex/DOCTNEW.htm

Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting, MCDP-1. Washington, D.C., 20 June 1997. http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/1/toc.htm

Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps. Strategy, MCDP-1-1. Washington, D.C., 20 June 1997. http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/1-1/toc.htm

_________________. Planning, MCDP-5. Washington, D.C., 21 July, 1997. http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/5/toc.htm

 Echevarria, Antulio, J. "Optimizing Chaos on the Nonlinear Battlefield," Military Review, September-October 1997: 26-31. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/sepoct97/echevarr.htm

Garreau, Joel. "Point Men For A Revolution: Can the Marines Survive a Shift From Hierarchies to Networks?" Washington Post, March 6, 1999: 1.

___________. "Exercise in Futurity: As War Looms, the Marines Test New Networks of Comrades," Washington Post, March 24, 1999: C1.

Greer, James. "Guerre du Chaos: Sealand Operations in the 21st Century."

Kelly III, Patrick. "Modern Scientific Metaphors of Warfare: Updating the Doctrinal Paradigm." Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992-93 (DTIC AD-A264 366).

Newman, Richard J. "Manual 6, Hell of a Read." U.S. News & World Report, December 16, 1996: 34. "The new format is matched by an interesting new message...the Marines are incorporating new sciences such as complexity and chaos theory into their doctrine."

Reason, J. Paul, with David G. Freymann. Sailing New Seas, The Newport Papers No. 13, Newport, RI, Naval War College Press, March 1998, 96 pages. http:/www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/np13/npl3toc.htm
 
 

VI. Military Theory

Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity, Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/complexity/index.html

Bassford, Christopher. Clausewitz In English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britian and America 1815-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. See Chapter 2 for Clausewitz as a non-linearist. http://www.clausewitz.com/CZWHOME/BOOKS/Bassford/BOOK2AD.htm

Bassford, christioher and Villacres, Edward J. "Reclaiming the Clausewitzean Trinity," Parameters, Autumn, 1995: http://www.clausewitz.com/CZWHOME/Tinity/TRINITY.htm

Beyerchen, Alan. "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Nature of War." International Security, Winter 1992-93: 59-90. Beyerchen portrays Clausewitz as a nonlinearist, but he "had no precise and commonly accepted vocabulary with which to express his insights into nonlinear systems." http//:www.dodccrp.org/copapp1.htm

______________. "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery," in Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997: 153-170. A spirited defense of nonlinear techniques applied to military affairs. Where others demand a mathematical formula, he raises the lowly metaphor to the heights it deserves. http://www.dodccrp.org/comch07.html

_______________. Why Metaphors Matter. Perspectives on Warfighting No. 5. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, n.d. "Understanding the power of implicit comparison and its uses within the Marine Corps."

Beaumont, Roger. War, Chaos and History. Westport, CN: Praeger, 1994.

Beckerman, Linda P. "The Non-Linear Dynamics of War." Science Applications International Corporation, 1999. http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/beckerman/non_linear.htm

Bjorkman, Eileen, et al. "Chaos Primer," in Air Campaign Course 1993: Research Projects, edited by Richard Muller, Larry Weaver, and Albert Mitchum. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1993.

Boyd, John R. "A Discourse on Winning and Losing," Unpublished briefing and essays, Air University Library, Document no. MU 43947, August 1987.

___________. "Destruction and Creation." September 3, 1976. http://www.belisarius,com/modern_business_strategy/boyd/destruction_and_creation.htm

Czerwinski, Tom. Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1998. http://www.dodccrp.org/copind.htm

Durham, Susan E. Chaos Theory for the Practical Military Mind. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, March 1997. http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/research/ay1997/acsc/97-0229.htm

Echevarria, Antulio, J. "Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality: A Revolution in Military Theory. Joint ForceQuarterly, Spring 1997: 29-36. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/spring97.htm#fff

Fallows, James. "A Priceless Original," U.S. News & World Report, March 24, 1997: 9. A eulogy to the late John Boyd.

Gell-Mann, Murray, "The Simple and the Complex," in Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997: 45-72. http://www.dodccrp.org/comch01.htm

Gore, John. Chaos, Complexity, and the Military. Washington, DC: National War College, 1996. "This paper briefly explains the key concepts behind chaos and complexity theory, looks at some of the efforts to apply them to military analysis, examines criticisms of these theories, and draws some implications from them for the military in the future."

Harned, Glenn M. The Complexity of War: The Application of Nonlinear Science to Military Science. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps War College, 1995.

Henry, Ryan and C. Edward Peartree. "Military Theory and Information Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1998: 121-135. http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98autumn/henry.htm

Ilachinski, Andrew. Land Warfare and Complexity, Part I: Mathematical Background and Technical Sourcebook. (CIM-461). Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1996.

_______________. Land Warfare and Complexity, Part II: An Assessment of the Applicability of Nonlinear Dynamic and Complex Systems Theory to the Study of Land Warfare. (CRM 96-68) Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, July 1996. "This report concludes that the concepts, ideas, theories, tools and general methodologies of nonlinear dynamics and complex systems theory show enormous, almost unlimited, potential for not just providing better solutions for certain existing problems of land combat, but for fundamentally altering our general understanding of the basic processes of war, at all levels."

James, Glenn E. Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications. Newport Paper No. 10. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, October 1996. A veritable textbook written for "the broad population of students attending the various war colleges." http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/np10/np10toc.htm

MacIntosh, J.P. "Emergent Conflict and the Challenge of Complexity: Leading Beyond Pragmatics." A paper prepared for the Cornwallis Group.

MacIntosh, J.P. "Connectivity: The Space, Tempo, and Exploitation of Risk in the Information Age," in Campen, Alan D. and Douglas H. Dearth, Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1998: 323-345.

Pellegrini, Robert P. The Links Between Science and Philosophy and Military Theory: Understanding the Past: Implications For the Future. Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, June 1995. http://www.au.af.mil/au/saas/studrsch/pellegri.doc

Schmitt, John F. Chaos, Complexity and War: What the New Nonlinear Dynamical Sciences May Tell Us About Armed Conflict. 4 September 1995.

Seaquist, Larry. The Complexity Ideas and Strategic Thinking. DRAFT. June 6, 1994. "To introduce, as a strawman, some new forms of strategic thinking about military affairs and security strategy suggested by the Complexity ideas. Components are invited: revision is in progress toward eventual publication in a journal."

Tagarev, Todor, Michael Dolgov, David Nicholls, Randal C. Franklin and Peter Axup. Chaos in War: Is It Present and What Does It Mean? Report to Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, Academic Year 1994 Research Program, June 1994. An analysis of data, such as aircraft losses in World War II, that empirically confirms the presence of Chaos in warfare, and its surprises. Summarized in: Nicholls, David and Todor D. Tagarev. "What Does Chaos Theory Mean for Warfare?" Airpower Journal, Fall 1994: 48-57.

Villacres, Edward J. and Christopher Bassford. "Reclaiming the Clausewitzean Trinity," Parameters, Autumn, 1995: http://www.clausewitz.com/CZWHOME/Tinity/TRINITY.htm

Watts, Barry D. ClausewitzeanFriction in Future War: McNair Paper 52. Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996. "If what counts in real war is not the absolute level of friction that either side experiences but the relative frictional advantage of one adversary over the other, then the question of using technology to reduce friendly friction to near zero can be seen for what it is: a false issue that diverts attention from the real business of war. Even comparatively small frictional advantages can, through nonlinear feedback, have huge consequences for combat outcomes..." Scholarly and definitive. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/mcnair/mcnair52/m52cont.html

_____________. "Friction in the Gulf War." Naval War College Review, Autumn 1995, 93-108. A review of Gordon and Trainor's The Generals' War wherein Watts grounds Clausewitzean friction in a nonlinear science context.

Wylie, J.C. "Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control," in George Edward Thibault, ed. The Art and Practice of Military Strategy. New York: Rutgers, The State University, 1967: 196-203. An early, pioneering work.
 
 

VII. RMA

Barker, Patrick K. Avoiding Technologically-Induced Delusions of Grandeur: Preparing the Air Force for an Information Warfare Environment. Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, 1 October 1996.

Cebrowski, Arthur K, and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future," U.S. Naval Institute Procedeedings, January 1998: 28-35. http://usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROcebrowski.htm

Czerwinski, Thomas J. "The Third Wave: What the Tofflers Never Told You," Strategic Forum, Institute for National Security Studies; National Defense University, Number 72, April 1996. http://ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum72.html

De Landa, Manuel. War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. New York: Zone Books, 1991. An quirky, but arresting, analysis of the relationship between nonlinear dynamics, technology and warfare.

Echevarria, Antulio, J. "Tomorrow’s Army: The Challenge of Nonlinear Change," Parameters, Autumn 1998: 85-98. Examines how technological change—in terms of its rate, scope, and nonlinear nature—exacerbates the difficulties of integrating new technologies into military structures. Contains recommendations, including use of Assumption-Based Planning. http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98autumn/echevarr.htm

Hammes, T.X. "War Isn’t a Rational Business," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, July 1998:

McKenzie, Kenneth F. "Beyond Luddites and Magicians: Examining the MTR," Parameters, Summer 1995: 15-21.

Mazarr, Michael J. "Chaos Theory and U.S. Military Strategy: A ‘Leapfrog’ Strategy for U.S. Defense Policy," in Alberts, David S. and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1997: 303-326. http://www.dodccrp.org/comch11.html

_______________. The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 10, 1994. Includes a brief discussion on Chaos theory underlying the difficulties in predicting an RMA, which is part of a larger sociopolitical transformation.

Murray, Williamson. "Innovation: Past and Future." Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1996: 51-59. "Finally, the services must encourage greater familiarity with nonlinear analyses...While some suggest that the military needs more engineers to encourage nonlinear thinking, they are wrong. In fact, what the services lack are biologists, mathematicians, and historians…"

_________________. "Preparing to Lose the Next War." Strategic Review, Spring 1998: 51-62.

________________. "Clausewitz Out, Computer In." The National Interest, Summer 1997: 57-64.

________________. "Military Culture Does Matter." Orbis, Winter 1999:

Owens, Mackubin, "The Use and Abuse of ‘Jointness," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1997: 50-59.

________________. "Technology, the RMA, and Future War," Strategic Review, Spring 1998: 63-70.

Schneider, James J. "Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity and the Promise of Information Warfare," JointForce Quarterly, Spring 1997: 21-28. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/spring97.htm#fff

Tanner, Jason B., Walter E. Lavrinovich, Scott R. Hall, and Mark Read. "Looking at Warfare Through a New Lens," Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1998: 59.

Tempestelli, Mark. "The Network Force." Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, June 1996:42-46.

Van Riper, Paul K. "Information Superiority," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1997: 54. Statement to subcommittees of the House National Security Committee on 20, March 1997.

Van Riper, Paul and Robert Scales. "Preparing for War in the 21st Century," Strategic Review, Summer 1997: 1-7

Van Riper, Paul and F.G. Hoffman. "Pursuing the Real Revolution in Military Affairs: Exploiting Knowledge-Based Warfare," National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 1998: 1-19. http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/nssp/nssq/summer98.html

In rebuttal see, Blaker, James R., "Revolution(s) in Military Affairs: Why the Critique? Winter 1999: 83-89, and reply, Hoffman, F.G., "Why the Critique? An Author’s Response." Winter 1999: 89-91. http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/nssp/nssq/winter99.html
 
 

VIII. Intel

Gourley, Robert D. "Intuitive Intelligence," Defense Intelligence Journal; Fall 1997: 61-75.

Jones, Teresa M. "A Non-Linear Interpretation of Clausewitz and Intelligence." Washington, DC: National War College, October 25, 1996. "Investigates how Clausewitz’s On War addresses the issue of intelligence, explores the value of understanding the importance of non-linearity in fully comprehending his thought processes, and posits some implications for the Intelligence Community."

Shultis, Don. "Etiology of an Intelligence Estimate." Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1997.
 
 

IX. Case Studies

Alamgir, Mohammad, Jeon Kwon Cheon, and Dean J. Longo. Chaotic Arms Control: Decision Making in the Post Cold War. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1996. "We built upon earlier studies to show decision making is the root of Chaotic results in human systems (and) identified the attractors, stability, and controls necessary to reduce adverse effects of US arms sales."

Chilcote, Ronald. "Interactive War in Vietnam: Pulverizing the Core Versus Nibbling at the Edges." Washington, DC: National War College, October 1996." This essay examines Clausewitz’s concepts of non-linearity and linearity in war, and uses these concepts to critique US strategy in Vietnam through an examination of the Rolling Thunder air campaign.

Gardner, Robert L., and James S. Robertson. "A Review of Jaeger Air." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1996: 36-38. Led to following exchanges, also in the Marine CorpsGazette: Moore, Daniel E., Jr. "A Response to ‘A Review of Jaeger Air," September 1996: 66, Gattuso, Joseph A., Jr. "Questioning the Critics of Jaeger Air," September 1996: 67-68, and Roberts, Ross L. "Let’s Put Jaeger to the Test,"September 1996: 67-72.

La Porte, Todd, Gene Rochlin, and Karlene Roberts, "The Self-Designing High Reliabilty Organization: Aircraft Carrier Flight Operations at Sea," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1987: 76-90. http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/summer/art7su98.htm

Libicki, The Future of Information Security. html://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/infosec/infosec.html

Miller, L.D., M.F. Sulcoski, and B.A. Farmer, "Complex Issues of Military Capability: Measurement, Assessment, Simulation." Copyright American Institute of Physics, 1997. "The nonlinear science methodology behind the Military Capability Spectrum Project (PRISM) is presented. . ."

Mueller, Theodore H. "Chaos Theory: The Mayaguez Crisis." U.S. Army War College, Military Studies Program, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 15, 1990.

Santee, Jay G. "Al Firdos and the Trinity of War." Washington, DC: National War College, 2 November 1998.

Schneider, James J. The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994. See Chapter One.

Shermer, Michael. "The Crooked Timber of History," Complexity, Vol. 2, No. 6, 1997: 23-29. "History is complex and often chaotic. Can we use this to better understand the past?" Auschwitz is the case study.

West, F.J., Jr. "War in the Pits: Marine-Future Traders Game." Strategic Forum, Institute for National Security Studies; National Defense University, Number 61, February 1996. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum61.htm

Womack, Scott Ellis. Chaos,Clausewitz and Combat: A Critical Analysis of Operational Planning in the Vietnam War. Monterey, CA: Navy Postgraduate School, December 1995.
 
 

X. Acquisition/Logistics

Clark, Rolf. "Systems Concepts for Executives," Strategic Forum, Institute for National Security Studies; National Defense University, Number 146, August 1998. "Education in the dynamics of systems is needed within DoD to accommodate strategic planning for procurement." http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum146.htm

Thomas, Marilyn M. "PPBS in the Information Age." Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 15 April 1998.
 
 

XI. Tools

Carr, Joseph J. Chaos Theory and Fractal Geometry: What Are They and How Are They Relevant to Naval Systems? Unpublished paper. 10 January 1989.

Dewar, James A., James J. Gillogly and Mario L. Juncosa. Non-Monotonicity, Chaos, and Combat Models, RAND Corporation, R-3995-RC, 1991.

Ditto, William L. and Louis M. Pecora. "Mastering Chaos." Scientific American, August 1993: 78-84. "It is now possible to control some systems that behave chaotically. Engineers can use stabilize lasers, electronic circuits and even the hearts of animals."

Hunt, Carl W. "Uncertainty Factor Drives New Approach to Building Simulations," Signal, October 1988: 75-77.

Ilichinski, Andrew. Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat (ISAAC): An Artificial-Life Approach toLand Warfare (CRM 97-61) Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, August 1997. Describes ISAAC, a computer simulation of land combat as a complex adaptive system. It addresses the basic question: "To what extent is land combat a self-organized emergent phenomenon?" The current version of ISAAC can be accessed at: http://www.cna.org/isaac


WEB SITES

Center for Naval Analyses Artificial Life Lab, http://cna.org/isaac

Clausewitz Homepage, http://www.clausewitz.com/index.htm

Clausewitz and Complexity, http://www.clausewitz.com/Complex/CWZcomplx.htm

The New Science Collection: Selective Bibliography. Marine Corps University Libraries, http://138.156.203.52/www/library/beyond.htm

War, Chaos, and Business, http://www.belisarius.com/



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